Transforming Leadership Analysis Essay Example for Free

Transforming Leadership Analysis Essay Introduction â€Å"The strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements demand that todays US Army forces conduct operations of a type, tempo, and duration that differ significantly from those of the past. The late 20th century required a force able to execute a fixed number of deliberate war plans and prepared to provide small forces for infrequent contingencies. The 21st century requires a force able to conduct sustained operations against several ongoing contingencies while remaining prepared to execute a number of deliberate war plans. Sustained operations and readiness to meet both old and new threats will be normal for the foreseeable future.   This situation requires changes in both structure and mindset. The Army is rapidly transforming itself to meet both requirements. The War on Terrorism has given the Army a strategic opportunity to reshape itself. It is leveraging its wartime focus to build campaign quality Army forces with joint and expeditionary capabilities. It is shedding inefficient processes and procedures designed for peacetime and re-examining institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures. (Kane Tremble 1994) This ongoing transformation is producing a better balance of capabilities. When complete. Army forces will be able to deploy more promptly and sustain operations longer to exercise decisive land power across the range of military operations. The Armys goal is to transform itself into a more responsive, effective expeditionary force capable of sustained campaigning any where in the world. Meanwhile, it continues to sustain operational support to combatant commanders and maintain the quality of the all-volunteer force†. (Our Army at War Relevant and Ready) Within the last century, the scale of war has made necessary a different type of leader. We no longer fight for our farms, villages, and hunting lands. Our interests have shifted from straits and mountain passes. In our current world, as a result of technological revolutions and ever growing political instability, we live in the threat of a global war. Actions have the potential to resonate in many continents subsequently influencing the economies, policies, and war strategies of nations worldwide. For these reasons, leaders must study the past and integrate historys lessons learned with the new challenges of leading within a heightened threat. Military leaders must maintain their grasp and focus on the technical mastery of war fighting, personal courage, and the ability to inspire men to fight for a common cause. Victory will lend itself to the commander who can master the terrain and find new or creative ways to employ his weapons and men. Leaders must be technically proficient with the arms they use to wage war. In a broad example, the Spartans studied the natural tendency of phalanx formations to shift right and employed special tactics to break off part of their formation and bring it upon the flank of their enemy. Even here with similar weapons and tactics, the Spartans pursued the mastery of their war fighting system and stood victorious on the field of battle. (Bass 1990) For a more detailed analysis, in 480 BC, during the Greco-Persian wars, a Spartan leader named Leonidas used terrain to his advantage to inflict incredible damage upon his Persian enemy. The Persian army numbering between 200,000 and 250,000 men marched towards the northwest pass into Greece. Leonidas moved his forces to block the vital passage at Thermopylae, a narrow passage with high walls. Though he reinforced his army along the way, Leonidas could muster only 7,000 men. He immediately began building a wall between the pass to further narrow it and channel his enemy. Overwhelmed, the Spartans lost the pass but managed to kill 20,000 Persians to their 1,000 lost. Several centuries later in the US civil war, General Lee used his mastery of terrain at the Maryes Heights during the battle of Fredericksburg, Maryland. Mid-November in 1862, union forces under General Burnside began to occupy positions outside Falmouth near Fredericksburg to meet Lee. In response, Lee entrenched his forces at Maryes Heights, a higher ground outside the town. In addition, the armies were now separated by the Rappahannock River. In December Burnside began his assault. Lee allowed the union forces to cross the river and then instructed his entire army to open fire, which pinned Burnside between the Heights and the Rappahannock River. Lee managed to inflict 3 to 1 casualties upon the northern armies during several futile, uphill charges and Burnside is forced to call off his offensive. He would try again in January 1863, but would be repulsed by Lees army in their superior position. (Kane Tremble 1994) Army Transformation â€Å"Transformation describes the process by which the current force is becoming the future force. It occurs as the Army incorporates new capabilities into its force structure and trains soldiers to use them. The future force is what the Army continuously seeks to become. It will be strategically responsive and joint interdependent. It will be capable of precision maneuver and able to dominate adversaries and situations across the range of military operations envisioned in the future security environment. The future force will be lighter, more lethal and agile, and optimized for versatility. It will be capable of seamlessly transitioning among the different types of military operations. Army transformation is more than materiel solutions. Adaptive and determined leadership, innovative concept development and experimentation, and lessons learned from recent operations produce corresponding changes to doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Change deliberately executed across DOTMLPF elements enables the Army to improve its capabilities to provide dominant land power to the joint force. Authoritative basis that sets into action the Armys transformation strategies, It provides specific objectives, assigns responsibilities for execution, and synchronizes resources. It directs the planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations and Army transformation within the context of the nations ongoing strategic commitments. These commitments and resource availability dictate the synchronization and pace of change. The Army Campaign Plan also sustains operational support to combatant commanders and maintains the quality of the all-volunteer force†. (FM 1) In contrast, when in history a leader has demonstrated cowardice, it has stripped them men of their warrior spirit, unity, and willingness to fight. When Antony fled the battle at Actium, his unit became disorganized and confused and subsequently lost the battle. The same result occurred when Napoleon abandoned his army at Waterloo. (Kane Tremble 1994) These characteristics of valor and moral courage are illustrated in the battles of General Washington. He sat with the remnants of the Continental Army at Valley Forge starving, inadequately sheltered, and with their only clothing rotting off their backs. Though he had been successful earlier on, Washington now found his army suffering through one of the worst American winters and troubled by low morale and desertion. In response to his pleas for additional funds and supplies the American congress suggested he quarter his troops in the nearby towns. Quartering was an acceptable practice and certainly expected given his circumstances, but Washington feared the impression his troops would have upon the American public and how it would affect the support for the war and the resulting government. After much moral deliberation, he gathered his troops and spoke to them. His decision to stay in the blistering cold and suffer the winter was unpopular at first, but his men began to understand his reasons and responded to his exemplary leadership. Washingtons personal actions and moral courage renewed his mens faith, convinced them to stay the course, and above all to do the right thing. In the combat action of the Revolutionary war Washington had a dozen mounts shot out beneath him, and was once missed by a round that struck through his overcoat and he narrowly escaped injury. His morality was accompanied by his physical courage in battle inspiring his men to fight on despite their hardships. (Tremble 1992) Literature Review Nearly a century later, the moral courage and personal character of its commanding general held together an undersupplied, undermanned, yet confident Confederate army. In the final battle of the Civil War, Lee demonstrated his dedication to his men and willingness to sacrifice himself over his command. The opposing armies were prepared for battle in a field near the town of Appomattox. Near the beginning of the assault Lees lines began to give way forcing him into a moral dilemma that affected the overall course of the war. In this moment Lee replaced his personal drive for victory with the sobering realization of defeat. Understanding the futility of further efforts against his enemy, Lee sent a flag of truce to his counterpart, despite the war cries and urging of his men to return to battle. He sacrificed personal pride and commitment to victory for his duty and loyalty to his men. General Lees character and obligation to do the right thing tied together and motivated the armies of the south and his soldiers understood that Lee acted for the benefit of the Confederacy and not for personal gain. In WWII, 80 yrs after Lees surrender, the US was at the height of submarine patrols against Japan in WWII, and Commander Howard Gilmore set a course from Brisbane, Australia into Japanese waters to interrupt their shipping lanes in the USS Growler. While surfaced to charge the submarines batteries, Gilmore was engaged and rammed by a Japanese ship. Attacking the crippled and idle Growler, enemy gunners quickly sprayed the bridge of the submarine killing the Assistant Officer of the Deck, lookout, and wounding Gilmore. The submarine remained under still heavy fire from the enemy machine gunners. Aware that the Growler would be sunk in the time needed for him to crawl below decks, Gilmore made the supreme sacrifice for his shipmates. Commander Gilmore put his command before himself and through his selfless and courageous act saved his crew at the cost of his own life. His ordered his crew to, Take her down! and then perished at sea. Perhaps the most decisive aspect of moral leadership is the ability to inspire a fire within people to fight for a common goal or unit objective. Moral courage and technical expertise and skill are the enabling devices for which a leader may instill confidence and trust among his troops, but it is the ability to produce a common objective that will inspire men to fight. A free and voluntary army requires an indisputable cause. (Tremble 1992) For example, General Washington was able to contain the rivaling factions of the American Revolution and then unite and direct them towards a common purpose. Unable to agree amongst them as to an appropriate course of action, it was Washingtons decisive and assertive leadership that unified their purpose. Despite their conflicting ideas, the Americans believed unanimously in the ability of Washington. In much the same way, Robert E. Lee fused and gave purpose to the Confederate states in the Civil War and Winston Churchill unified the rivaling factions of the British government during WWII. One of the better examples of inspirational leadership is from recent history. Al-Qaeda forces draw their strength and morally rationalize their terrorist attacks through their fanatical belief in the justness of their cause. The terrorist leaders harness the energy created by this fanaticism in their culture and focus it towards a common goal. This leadership style establishes a purpose and allows for a transition into active fighting spirit. These leadership traits are fundamental and remain at the foundation of successful military leadership. They remain a leadership challenge for all fighting men in the worlds militaries and occur at all levels within the military force. Those who master and arm themselves with these concepts are positioned to succeed while those who ignore them are destined to fail. Transformational Leadership and Subordinate Outcomes on Army a Case Study Basss (1985a, 1985b) ideas have enthused Ð ° substantial amount of study. The mass of this study has investigated the foundation line or Ð ° circuitous effect of transformational behaviors on Ð ° leader or unit recital and effectiveness. Research on the hypothesized straight effects of ordinate outcomes: admiration, respect, and Ð ° trust of the leader, motivation and commitment to Ð ° shared goals and visions; innovative and creative approaches; and growth reflecting the unique needs and desires of Ð ° individual followers. According to Bass, Ð ° follower outcomes promoted by transformational behaviors result in Ð ° levels of organizational attempt and recital over and further than what are possible by Ð ° transactional behavior. These effects of Ð ° transformational leadership on Ð ° subordinate outcomes defines the augmentation hypothesis, which has Ð °, guided empirical testing of Basss ideas about transformational leadership.   Basss (1985a, 1985b) ideas are particularly striking to organizations, like todays military, in which Ð ° success depends on the participation and Ð ° active participation of all organizational members. U.S. Army doctrine, for instance, mentions leadership as the most essential component of combat power or the ability to fight and win. This doctrine more envisions that leaders add to effectual unit recital by inspiring Ð ° purpose, direction, and Ð ° will to win. Basss ideas for the expansion of successful army leaders have been so striking that the U.S. military in recent times published Ð ° volume discussing issues and insinuations raised by the distinction among transformational and transactional behaviors (Bass, 1996). Study in U.S. Army units has Ð ° supported these doctrinal views relating to the significance of the interactions between leadership, soldier circumstances, and unit performance. Siebold (1994), for instance, measured the work enthusiasm of soldiers 2 to 4 weeks earlier to their units contribution in replicated battle exercises. Strong, optimistic correlations were obtained among pre-exercise modes of soldier enthusiasm and rated success of units throughout the exercises. In adding, the motivation-unit-performance association was moderated by leader efficiency. So as to, when units were grouped by discernments of leader efficiency, strong, optimistic correlations were obtained for units with the uppermost leadership ratings but not for units with Ð ° lowest ratings. Savell, Teague, and Tremble tested the connection among leader-follower characteristics. They reported that Ð ° positive association existed among the enthusiasm levels of leaders and followers and that the force of that association augmented as followers reports of Ð ° Leader’s overall ability also increased. (Tremble 1992) Organizational Level and Transformational Behaviors Bass (1990) argued that the principles of Ð ° transformational leadership apply to all organizational levels. Consistent with Ð ° argument, transformational research has Ð ° examined samples ranging from cadets at military institutes to executives and Ð ° world leaders. Potentially inconsistent with Basss (1985b) quarrel, though, is the deviation in results obtained across organizational settings. For example, Spangler and Braiotta (1990) reported that transactional scope was slightly more strongly correlated with audit committee efficiency than were transformational features. In this framework, monitoring mistakes and satisfying accuracy may have been essential for leader recital. As such, lively management by omission and dependent reward predicted recital as powerfully as did transformational actions. Spangler and Braiotta as well found that active, management by omission was as powerfully connected with the transformational scales as those scales were connected between one another. In difference, Howell and Avolio reported that active management by omission was unconstructively connected with unit recital and transformational leadership in monetary institutions.   (Bass 1986) How to report for these unreliable effects is not overall clear. Relationships among leaders and followers vary crosswise organizations. As leaders move on in organizations, they grow carefulness and authority, use less time intimately supervising followers, and take on broadened responsibilities. Crossways levels, followers frequently vary in status, carefulness, independence, and promise. In adding, the progressive understanding and training conventional by organizational personnel might generate diverse expectations between junior leaders, more senior leaders, and followers about actions that comprise suitable leadership actions. Therefore, the unreliable effects obtained for transformational and transactional behaviors could reproduce a number of issues, together with the suitability of a single-form device, for instance the MLQ, for recitation variations across levels in leadership roles, in function relationships, or in contexts. (Bass 1986) Though the connotation of leader actions and of follower prospect concerning that behavior might modify crosswise organizational levels, the regularity of precise types of behavior might also vary. Kuhnert and Lewis explained that adults are extra liable to connect in transformational behaviors after they have attained advanced stages of ethical growth. Behind this outlook, increased transformational behavior (but not essentially transactional behavior) was originated for other senior Army leaders (Bass et al., 1987b). On the contrary, transactional behavior was originated to typify victorious cadets all through their pre-commissioning preparation and learning at a state military college. Contrary proof was obtainable by Lowe et al. (1996), who completed in their meta-analysis that transformational leadership did not considerably vary as a purpose of organizational level. (Bass 1996) Our current National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and existing Army force structure were ill conceived for the future of the Army. As a result of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the Army was right sized and structured to meet the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars (MTWs). However, this force structure was never intended to support current deployment levels for military operations other than war (MOOTW). In fact, the BUR warned that, Protracted commitments to peace operations could lower the overall readiness of US active duty forces over time, and in turn, reduce our ability to fulfill our strategy to be able to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Increased MOOTW deployments such as Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia have driven the Armys operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to historically high levels. As prophesied by the BUR, the Armys overall readiness is declining. Moreover, given our current NSS, a turbulent international community ripe with MOOTW opportunities and continuing fiscal pressures, it is unlikely the Army can expect a reduction to OPTEMPO in the near future. In short, the Army is faced with a strategy and force structure mismatch. To compound this mismatch, the Army faces another pressing problem in its responsibilities to support joint war fighting. As joint war fighting doctrine continues to evolve and improve, deficiencies concerning critical missions such as rear area protection of the joint logistics and sustain base and the need for a war-termination force have surfaced (US Department of Defense, 1995, pp.1-9). These unique Army missions pose a difficult challenge. How can the Army correct these joint war fighting deficiencies in an environment that already overtaxes its capabilities and resources? Late in the Cold War, the Armys strategy for using its Reserve Component (RC) forces was totally different from todays. Born of the joint vision of General Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the Total Force concept was embraced by an Army all too aware of the problems created by not using significant RC forces in either the Korean or Vietnam Wars. The Armys overall readiness is declining. Moreover, given our current National Security Strategy, a turbulent international community ripe with opportunities for military operations other than war and continuing fiscal pressures, it is unlikely the Army can expect a reduction to OPTEMPO in the near future. In short, the Army is faced with a strategy and force structure mismatch (1993). It is time to abandon the conflict between the active Army and Army National Guard (ARNG) over Guard readiness and look at ARNG maneuver unit utility from a new perspective. The search for a new paradigm properly begins by considering the connection between readiness and risks. Reserve Component (RC) units cannot attain the readiness levels of equivalent Active Component (AC) units in 39 days of yearly pre-mobilization training. Therefore, some degree of risk will always be associated with early deployment of RC units. The key question is: how much risk is acceptable? If the risk of deploying ARNG maneuver units early is within acceptable limits, the Army could benefit greatly. (Bass 1996) The decision to deploy these units meant that the Army was accepting some degree of tactical risk that units could not perform some of the missions for which they were organized. Even during the defense build-up in the mid-80s, the Army maintained its strategy of early deployment of RC maneuver forces. In a security environment of high threat and increasing resources, the Army was willing to accept the tactical risks associated with deploying these RC units (Noyes, 1995, pp.8-9). Today, the Army faces no peer competitor such as the massive Soviet Army, just a small group of ill-trained, ill-equipped regional armies. Army and joint capabilities for precision deep attack of enemy forces have revolutionized the ground combat concept of battle space. No longer must the enemy be reduced in a desperate fight by maneuver elements along the forward line of troops (FLOT). Deadly surface and air joint operational fires, many miles away, can now reduce enemy maneuver units from the FLOT. Although resource constraints have reduced the active Armys relative maneuver combat power by nearly half since the RC units cannot attain the readiness levels of comparable AC units in 39 days of yearly pre-mobilization training. Therefore, some degree of risk will always be associated with early deployment of RC units. The key question is: how much risk is acceptable? If the risk of deploying ARNG maneuver units early is within acceptable limits, the Army could benefit greatly. (Waldman et al 2001) In November 1999, US Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki directed the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to undertake a comprehensive review of the Army force structure. In response, the TRADOC commander, General John Abrams, began developing a brigade-sized force capable of rapid deployment, yet with the staying power of the current heavy force (1993). This force would have to be able to respond to the growing number of peacekeeping and small-scale conflicts, as well as, facing the problems of nontraditional threats and the likely hood of terrorist threats. The Army today is built on a heavy force and a light force. The heavy force has the necessary firepower and sustainability but require too much time to deploy. The light force can deploy quickly, but lack the power and sustainability to remain for extended periods of time. (Waldman et al 2001) Under this new transformational plan, there would be a combat force comprised of elements of the active Army heavy and light forces, along with, elements of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces. This would provide a mix of forces that could deploy fast, pack the necessary combat power, and be able to sustain contact for an extended period of time without direct support. It would also provide our part-time soldiers with the necessary additional training to sustain their combat readiness and confidence. This will bring the armed forces to the realization of an Army of one. As we can see from the events of today, that the conventional Army of the past is no longer the Army of the future. The forces have to be ready to react to any possible action or conflict that may arise. Terrorism is an entity that has a broad hand. The multitude of the armed forces has had to come together to provide the necessary force to not only fight abroad, but to secure to home front from attack. The part-time soldier has stepped up in this new transformational Army to take to job of homeland protectors while the specialized forces have taken on the challenge of rooting out the evil. Did the US Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki have a premonition of the events that unfolded over the last few months? He may or may not, but the fact is that he new that the Army of old could not fight the battles of the future. Transformation was inevitable, and he was the man to see the emerging trend of modern day warfare. Present The observations illustrated above show how far the Army has come in the past 15 years concerning civilians in the Total Army. The new FM 22-100 is the latest indicator that the Total Army must depend on all its components in performing todays missions.   The Army is smaller today than at any time since before World War II and it continues to downsize. In less than a decade, the Army reduced its ranks by more than 630,000 people, closed more than 700 installations and changed from Ð ° forward-deployed force to a Continental United States-based, power-projection force. The number of deployments in that same period increased by 300 percent accordingly, missions were realigned and force structures changed. The bottom line is that DACs have assumed responsibilities in the Total Army that were not even envisioned a couple of decades ago. The Army simply cannot mobilize, deploy or sustain itself without its civilian component. The old ways of doing business do not work anymore. The outdated paradigms that endure about DACs should be revisited. DACs roles, responsibilities and leader challenges are in constant flux. Emphasizing the need to develop civilian leaders for positions of greater responsibility, Reimer stated, We cannot leave the development of our civilian leaders to chance. The development of civilian leaders starts with the accession and training of interns. We must hire the best and train them to meet the challenge,; of the 21st century . It is important that we continue the emphasis on professional development for all civilians through the executive level. (Waldman et al 2001) It was only a little more than a decade ago that the Army began providing progressive and sequential competency-based leadership training for civilians through the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Before the mid-1980s, a career track comparable to those for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) did not exist for DACs. Historically, the career program functional chiefs for about 25 percent of DACs who were in career programs determined their technical requirements. Supervisors determined the appropriate training for those not in career programs. Not enough attention was given to identifying civilians with potential for advancement or systematically determining the skills needed to prepare high-caliber individuals for progressively more responsible leadership roles. In essence, leader development for DACs was not a consideration. (Tremble et al 1997) The difficulty of creating a civilian training program was compounded by the fact that civilians enter the federal work force at various levels based on their qualifications for specific jobs, rather than at a single point as officers and enlisted personnel do at the start of their careers. An individual is hired with a presumption of having the training needed for the position he is to occupy. Additional training is provided only after finding that the person needs to enhance the skills required by the job. Bringing such a person to a high-performing level in a reasonable amount of time is a tremendous challenge for any commander or leader. Historically civilian training does not compete with military training for resources. The Army has made considerable progress in the past 15 years in modernizing civilian personnel management. Programs such as the Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) and the Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES) have eliminated many of the earlier systems complexities, resulting in some civilian developmental programs more closely resembling those for officers and enlisted personnel. ACTEDS provides a career progression road map for developing and training civilians from entry to senior level. The development of civilian leaders, like that of their uniformed colleagues, is a blend of institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. The Civilian Leader Development Action Plan provides similar frames of reference as plans developed for officers, warrant officers and NCOs. ACTEDS specifies training in two areas: professional technical career training and leadership and training. There are some underlying concepts that are common to all three courses. The content in each course is embedded in the Armys leadership doctrine and values. Participants experience leadership in its purest formexperience being the operative word. Experiential learning permeates the course from the moment class begins and continues until the participants depart. CLTD courses are the only ones the Army offers that employ experiential learning. Adults learn better if they experience a situation rather than simply hearing about it from others. In experiential learning, everyone in a situation has his own personal experience. Human nature being what it is, no two experiences are exactly the same because of individual backgrounds, prior experiences, biases, values, beliefs and attitudes. Once the common experience is complete, participants examine the varied perspectives in the group and look at why those different views exist. Through discussion, participants begin to discover the factors that came together to create the behaviors others saw. They consider the lessons they can take away from the experience and then examine possible new courses of action. Through this process, greater and deeper understanding develops, trust grows and teams build. (Kane Tremble 1994) The focus is on how people work together, as contrasted to what they may be working on. Participants examine how the group made decisions and how those decisions affected members commitment to the final product, how conflicts were resolved, how people communicated with one another and how groups dealt with common issues or problems. In doing this, the participants learn more about themselves and others. Many opportunities arise throughout each course for participants to discover how influential they can be with other members. They live the Armys values and come away with a real understanding of those valuesnot merely slogans that are little more than bumper stickers. They polish influential communication skills and gain a better understanding of their individual strengths and the areas where they may want to change. Opportunities abound for those who desire to practice new behaviors and receive feedback from others in the group. They also examine the choices they have in their lives, which often yield surprises. If individuals see that they are empowered to influence their own behavior, then they can do a better job of influencing and motivating others. Leaders also learn how to diagnose the culture in their organizations, develop visions for their organizations and lead change. Class participants learn what works for them personally and do not simply take home cookie-cutter recipes for leadership. Condition: Peace and War The previous debate was concerned mainly with serving leaders comprehend how the leadership equation develop as Ð ° leader moves from strategic leadership to superior levels. As Ð ° general rule, the wartime mission is more serious and Ð ° result of breakdown takes on Ð ° potentially disastrous consequences. Therefore, the arrow under the assignment column is considerably bigger than the other arrows. A unit that breakdowns to convene its peacetime tasking might ruined an operational readiness inspection (ORI) or acquire a commander fired. Over time of Ð ° war, the mental state of followers takes on superior meaning since terror complicates their aptitude to execute. Leaders have to take this aspect into reflection when transitioning from tranquility to war. To recompense for fear and the superior significance of mission achievement, leaders might understandably turn out to be more demanding.   In case we deduce too much from the above case, we would propose that a demanding style is not Ð ° routine response to a battle environment. Under usual conditions, a leaders style wont transform simply as the bullets are flying. It depends on the circumstances and the leader. If one has never individually practiced combat, one cannot recognize in what the difficulties continuously mentioned actually consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliancy and outstanding skill. . . . Everything in war is straightforward, but the simplest thing is not easy. The difficulties build up and end by producing Ð ° kind of resistance that is unthinkable if one has experienced war, Ð ° last war versus peace related issue should be addressed at the present. As we change to a more follower-oriented, empowering leadership model in peace for example TQM, there are possible pitfalls for us when busy in battle operations. The basic principle of essential training over the years has been to smash down the individuals civilian mind-set that is obviously opposed to subsequent potentially life-threatening battleground orders. In place of the inhabitant mind-set, we replacement military discipline throughout fundamental training, an automatic compliance to Ð ° strict leadership style. The objective of Ð ° QAF is just the contradictory. It seeks to move authority from the leader to subordinates and to Ð ° solicit ideas and insights from followers in a very friendly, benign atmosphere. How will the methodically indoctrinated and empowered QAF follower react if the units control takes on a more despotic style during battle? This is a matter that prospect leaders, mainly at the unit level, need to address. (Spangler Braiotta 2000) Condition: Combined Leadership One more difference in the leadership equation that will turn out to be more and more significant in todays atmosphere involves the mixture of friendly forces. A single-service process is comparatively simple to organize since like-minded persons are concerned in accomplishing the task. Their communication is facilitated by an ordinary dictionary and a ordinary orientation to their exacting way of combating. One time we comprise members of an additional service, though, additional considerations and sensitivities require to be addressed. Differences in service doctrine and operational methods not merely aggravate working jointly but can have a harmful, even deadly consequence on operations. Additionally, inter service rivalries have intricate and will carry on to confuse mission achievement. The rivalry between Gen Douglas MacArthur and a admirals Ernest J. King/Chester W. Nimitz in the World War II Pacific Theater led to a less than best harmonization of operations. Alternatively, Army general Omar Bradley and an Air Force general Elwood R. Quesada worked fine jointly. The circumstances become especially multifaceted when allies are drawn in. Additionally to doctrinal and service mismatching, cultural and chronological differences complex efforts to organize joint operations. In an Airpower Journal article The Staff Experience and Leadership Development, Gen John Shaud noted that a likelihood of your contribution in a joint alliance staff in this post-cold war world has augmented by an order of magnitude. He served as a chief of staff for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) until lately and as of that skill made the following observation: On the alliance staff, as is the case with some new management position . . . my main assignment was to organize the activities of the workforce. . . . Additionally to what you might usually wait for that to entail, I originate that I also had to be a negotiator, diplomat, taskmaster, and cheerleader. I learned also that on the SHAPE staff (as well as on most coalition staffs), some of the most significant factors to be measured were appreciating intrinsic differences in culture and speech and possessing a solid intellect of history. Future Operating Environment Challenges and Recommendations â€Å"The Army is preparing today to meet the four types of challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and Disruptive. To address traditional challenges, the Army is extending its mastery of major combat operations. It is maintaining the ability to counter todays conventional threats while preparing for tomorrows anti-access environments. The ability to prevail in major combat operations is a crucial responsibility and primary driver of capabilities development. Many capabilities required for major combat operations apply across the range of military operations. Those capabilities include: Strategic and operational mobility; Advanced information systems to support command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Precision weaponry; Force protection: and Sustain. The Army is broadening and deepening its ability to counter irregular challenges. However, because the Nation cannot afford two armies, the Army is meeting this requirement by increasing the versatility and agility of the same forces that conduct conventional operations. In many situations, the combination of traditional and irregular threats presents the most demanding challenges to military effectiveness. This combination requires soldiers and units able to transition between the operations required to counter conventional and irregular threats. Preempting catastrophic threats includes deterring the use of, or destroying weapons of mass destruction. It is increasing its ability to rapidly project forces and decisively maneuver them over both global and theatre distances. It is seeking minimal reliance on predictable, vulnerable deployment transition points (intermediate staging bases) or ports of entry. To prepare for disruptive challenges, the Army is maintaining and improving a range of capabilities, minimizing the potential for single point strategic surprise and failure. It is also developing intellectual capital to power a culture of innovation and adaptability, the Armys most potent response to disruptive threats. While preparing for irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges, the Army is retaining its ability to dominate land operations in traditional conflicts. American land forces clearly occupy a commanding position in the world with respect to defeating traditional military challenges. The Army must retain a superior position, particularly in the face of modernizing armies that might challenge US partners and interests. Failure to maintain a qualitative edge over these traditional threats would promote instability and create vulnerabilities that adversaries might attempt to exploit. While technology will be crucial to achieving greater operational agility and precision lethality, the human dimension will continue to be the critical element of war. The soldier will remain the centerpiece of Army organizations. As the complexity of operations increases, well-trained, innovative, and disciplined soldiers and leaders will become more important than ever. Recruiting, training, educating, and retaining of soldiers is vital to maintaining land power dominance in all forms of conflict†.   (FM 1) Conclusion The research of Bà  ss, Burns, Kà ®uzà ¥s and Pà ®snà ¥ had one major preliminary task, then, was to assemble a list of behaviors that seemed to be critical. That list would be used in surveys and discussions with the study participants. While this study focused on division commanders, the requisite behaviors were typically relevant to any level of the organization, and discussions with participants, who ranged in grade from captain to lieutenant general, went beyond the exclusive behavior of division commanders. (As one indicator of the relative universal applicability of basic leader behaviors, an Army Research Institute study a few years ago on leader effectiveness in light infantry platoons showed many critical behaviors at that level were similar to those seen important for division commanders.) An interesting but not surprising finding from that exploration of previous studies was that certain behaviors kept surfacing as crucial to good leadership. There is no doubt that Army officers over the years have had a solid feel for what good looks like. While there are some differences of opinion on the relative importance among behaviors, there is remarkable agreement across grades and branches on which set of behaviors really make a difference. It is also important to note that in distinguishing good leaders from others, the distinction did not fall between leaders on one side, who focused on mission, and leaders on the other, who focused on people. Rather, it was how leaders approached mission and people that accounted for the perceived differences in the quality of their leadership. The team that created the study also recognized that operations in Iraq present an environment that epitomizes two fundamental challenges for leaders of all organizations: the need to attain immediate tactical success while maintaining the long-term health of the force; and establish the necessary centralized control to ensure integration of operating systems while encouraging and supporting the required initiative at subordinate levels. The study team eventually isolated 29 behaviors, derived from current leadership doctrine and the synthesis of prior studies. That preliminary list was further reviewed by a number of active duty and retired officers who had extensive leadership experience. An Army War College class and some scientists familiar with Army leadership principles and methods also helped to refine the list. The final list became one of the survey instruments used in the study. These 29 behaviors were seen as relevant and comprehensive by the 77 officers from the four divisions, who eventually participated in the study at their home stations within a few weeks of returning from OIF. To gain an external view of division mission accomplishment, two corps commanders and a deputy corps commander were queried about the combat performance of the divisions and the styles of the division commanders (individual or unit data was not specified in the report; subordinate participants provided survey input anonymously). In each division, the division commander, the assistant division commanders (when available), the chief of staff, eight members of the division staff, and from six to ten subordinate commanders completed survey instruments and participated in lengthy and wide-ranged discussions with study team members. These participants had observed the division commander during most or all of the divisions deployment to OIF. (Waldman et al 2001) The study report provided a number of conclusions and recommendations. The study concluded that we have a lot of impressive people in todays very busy Army! The study further concluded that we still have some development and selection work to do. In particular, we must have the interpersonal skills to gain trust and build the essential horizontal and vertical teams needed to take full advantage of the high level of tactical and technical competence that typically exists in our Army. Twelve behaviors, validated by officers returning from a combat theater, were selected as the most important factors in creating a command climate that supports operational excellence and motivating competent people to continue their military service. These behaviors, referred to in the study as the Big 12, also best differentiate between good and poor leaders. Note that the criterion included both short- and long-term mission requirements: tactical success today; a strong Army tomorrow. Army doctrine should explicitly acknowledge that being a good manager is not the same as being a good leader. FM 22-100 and related publications ought to provide all officers and NCOs with textual resources to clearly articulate the differences between supervising, administering and creating leadership within their units, and they should suggest ways in which the skills and aptitudes that contribute to each of these complementary, but distinct, competencies can be independently trained and appraised. The Officer Evaluation Report and Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report and their governing regulations must also be modified to reflect leadership-management distinctions and provide means to separately evaluate performances in each of these areas. To determine pure leadership competency, in particular, serious thought should be given to incorporating nontraditional forms of assessment such as 360-degree evaluations into the rating process. Here, the observations of peers and subordinates are factored into the rated soldiers performance review. When properly interpreted, such data can be useful in matching the right person to the right job, as well as helping to focus leaders attention on truly serving their teams and organization, rather than just pleasing their boss. Impressive gains in performance and productivity are being reported by civilian companies such as Frito Lay and Intel, which have successfully merged 360-degree and similar assessment methods into their human resource systems (Champy). Armed with such tools and an expanded accent upon critical self-evaluation, those in command or other positions of responsibility can then more accurately identify strengths and weaknesses in their own personal inventory of people skills, as well as in the collective inventory of their staff, and make appropriate adjustments. Finally, the importance of participative, emotionally engaged followers in the leadership process can hardly be overstated. Because all military leaders are also followers in some context, leadership doctrine must explicitly consider the characteristics of effective followers and instruct leaders how best to forge and encourage them at all levelsfrom the fire team on up. Creating wide parameters within which followers may exercise judgment and make decisions, exploring/aligning the personal goals and values of soldiers with those of the organization and providing meaningful, responsive incentives to excel must be stressed as critical leadership tasks. When effectively executed, these musts will combine to create teams with genuinely shared vision and commitment, operating via an influence connection between leaders and followers that transcends the tacitly coercive nature of military relationships. In this way, authentic leadership will underpin effective command in our Army, attracting and retaining the high-quality soldiers so vital to future operations. (Waldman et al 2001) References Bass, B. M. (1985a). Leadership and performance beyond expectations: New York: Free Press. Bass, B. M. (1985b). Leadership: Good, better, best Organizational Dynamics, 3(3), 26-40. Bass, B. M. (1990). 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No. 1625). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social: Sciences. Tremble, T. R., Jr., Kane, T. D., Stewart, S. R. (1997). A note on organizational leadership as problem solving (Res. Note No. 97-03) Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Waldman, D. A., Bass, B. M., Yammarino, F. J. (2001). Adding to contingent reward behavior: The augmenting effect of charismatic leadership: Group and Organization Studies, 15, 381-394.